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Rationality and Efficiency: from Experimentation in 
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Dorian JULLIEN (GREDEG/Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis)  
Judith FAVEREAU (CES/Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)  
Cléo CHASSONNERY-ZAIGOUCHE (CES/Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) 
 
Abstract  
This paper investigates how foundational and conceptual issues around 
economic rationality, which are usually discussed with respect to economic theory, 
materialize into recent applied microeconomics. We concentrate on three radically 
different subfield of microeconomics – the economics of discrimination, development 
economics and the economics of insurance – to look at how the recent rise of 
experimental methods and behavioral economics within mainstream economics have 
changed the conceptual relationship between economic rationality and economic 
efficiency, without changing the substance of these notions. The perspective of going 
from applied work of microeconomics in the field to conceptual and foundational 
issues on rationality reveals another issue that has not been much discussed in the 
reflexive literature yet: how warranted is the analytical distinction made in economics 
among interpersonal preferences, intertemporal preferences and preferences for risk 
and uncertainty? We show that this issue has straightforward consequences both on 
both economic theory and on the real world through the policy recommendations 
made by microeconomists.  
Introduction 
Lawrence Blume and David Easly (2008, p.1) start their entry on “Rationality” 
in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics as follows:  
“Rationality is for economists as pornography was to the US Supreme Court, 
undefinable but nonetheless easily identified; and yet, like the Justices of the 
Court, no two economists share a common definition”. 
 
Nevertheless, when their entry is read along with the one of Amartya Sen 
(2008) on “Rational Behaviour” it is possible to identify some of the major threads 
that characterize the evolution of rationality in postwar mainstream economics and to 
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point out some the main features explaining its definitional ambiguity. Basically, at a 
foundational and conceptual level, there are two main ambiguities surrounding 
rationality in mainstream economics. 
The first ambiguity concerns the relationship between, on the one hand, 
rationality as consistency of choices and rationality as self-interest maximization 
(Blume and Easly 2008 pp.5-6; Sen 2008 pp.1-5). Although these two conceptions 
have technical
1
 and historical
2
 differences, the correspondence between them was an 
important topic of discussion from the 1950s to the 1970s, known as the problem of 
“‘rationalizability’” (Sen 2008, p.2 quoting Richter 1971; see also Hands 2006, 
pp.173-176). The distinction between both conceptions of rationality was quite clear 
in the highly theoretical discussion of the time. However, it bequeathed some 
confusion within subsequent developments in the mainstream of economic theory. For 
instance, the conception of rationality as consistency of choice fits well “[t]he first 
stage in the development” (Blume and Easly 2008, p.8) of analytical work in general 
equilibrium theory where the “analysis will be as abstract and general as possible, to 
encompass as large a repertory of behavior as possible” (ibid.). However, “[t]he 
second stage […] requires explicit behavioural assumptions about agent behaviour 
and describing the resulting equilibrium”. Hence, while most economists often talk 
about rationality as consistency, most economists often practice economics with 
rationality as self-interest maximization (ibid., p.5). One important – but perhaps 
implicit – reason for the prevalence of working with rationality as self-interest 
maximization in economics stems from its analytical necessity for the dual 
correspondence between Pareto optimality and competitive equilibrium (one implies 
the other and vice-versa) proven by the “‘Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
                                                 
1
 Technically, both consist in imposing logical relations but on different primitive concept: in 
the former, they are imposed on a choice function that takes the choices of an economic agent as 
primitive from which his underlying preferences are determined, and in the latter, they are imposed on 
the agent’s preference ordering which are taken as primitive and represented by a utility function which 
determines his choices; see Mas-Colell et. al. (1995) chap. 1 for a pedagogical and technical discussion 
of this issue. 
2
 The consistency of choice approach is an important feature of the 20
th
 century history of 
demand theory, while the self-interest maximization approach has an older though quite complex 
history in economics.  
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Economics’” (Sen 2008, p.3 quoting Arrow 1951, Debreu 1959 and Arrow and Hahn 
1971).  
The second and related ambiguity surrounding rationality in economics 
concerns its status as a positive/descriptive versus normative/prescriptive hypothesis 
(Blum and Easley 2008, pp.6-7; Sen 2008, pp.1-2; see also Sen 1987). In other words, 
it is not always obvious and there is no general agreement on whether rationality is 
conceptualized in order to predict and explain how rational people act (by first 
characterizing rationality and then assuming that people are rational), or in order to 
evaluate and prescribe the way people ought to act to be rational. 
The issues discussed by Blume and Easely (2008) and Sen (2008) are quite 
conceptual in that they are principally related to economic theory. In this paper, we 
seek to illustrate how theses conceptual issues materialize into recent applied 
microeconomics. The purpose of our contribution is to demonstrate that, when these 
ambiguities around rationality are investigated from this point of view (from the 
applied, not theoretical, work in microeconomics) it reveals another foundational and 
conceptual issue that has not been much discussed yet from a reflexive perspective:  
how warranted is the strong analytical and conceptual division made in economics 
among (a) interpersonal decisions, (b) decisions under risk and uncertainty, and (c) 
intertemporal decisions? We will see that this issue also has its set of ambiguities 
which have straightforward consequences on economic theory as well as on the real 
world through the policy recommendations made by microeconomists. 
It is interesting to notice that Blume and Easly’s entry is made from the “point 
of view […] of working economists” (ibid) who defend: (1) “methodological 
individualism, the claim that social phenomena must be explained in terms of 
individual actions which in turn must be explained through individuals’ motivation” 
(ibid., our emphasis); and (2) “The rationality principle, that individuals act in their 
best interest as they perceive it” (ibid., original emphasis) to be the underlying theory 
of action in economics. They emphasize that their “interest is in social life rather than 
in the psychology of an individual” (ibid., p.2; see also pp.10-13). Our perspective of 
going from the applied work to the foundational and conceptual issue provides a 
critical assessment of how well the rationality principle allows economics to grasp 
“social life” with and without being interested “in the psychology of an individual”.  
In this respect, and to be consistent with the specific perspective taken in this 
paper, our discussions of applied microeconomics will stress the importance of (a) the 
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social context into which the economic problems investigated are embedded, and (b) 
the scientific context into which applied microeconomics is embedded. The latter 
point is mainly constituted by two interrelated aspects: (b.1) the local evolution of the 
standard framework in each of the subfield of microeconomics that we are going to 
discuss, and (b.2) the global recent rise of experimental methods and of behavioral 
economics within the mainstream of economics. Although are going to stress (a), (b) 
and (b.1) along our discussions in the core of the paper, the brief remaining of this 
introduction is dedicated to (b.2). 
Let’s start by considering the following quote: 
“The difficulty is as follows: an important objective of research on organization 
is to be able to compare different organizations and to assess their efficiency. 
For that, it is necessary to have some criterion of efficiency. In economic 
models the criterion of efficiency usually depends on individual preferences, as 
is the case with the Pareto criterion, as well as various proposed notions of 
fairness. If preferences are endogenous, the logical basis for a normative 
analysis is unclear.” (Reiter 1989, p.286, quoted by Lee 2013, p.29) 
 
Lee is here quoting Reiter to illustrate the changes that were happening in the 
late 1980s around the legitimacy of experimental methods in economics. At the time, 
there was already a tension between two ways of using experimental methods in 
economics that are now usually known as experimental market economics and 
behavioral economics. The evolution of this tension along with its implications at 
methodological, theoretical and normative levels is the subject of a growing body of 
reflexive contributions (e.g., Guala 2005; Davis 2006, 2008; Heukelom 2011; Santos 
2011; Lee 2011; Jullien and Vallois 2013). Moreover, since the Nobel memorial 
attribution to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith in 2002 the use of experimental 
methods has definitely established their legitimacy within the mainstream of 
economic theory, and behavioral economics is part of this maistream. 
Correspondingly,  reflexive contributions have focused their attention to the way 
either experimental market economics or behavioral economics have respectively 
impacted mainstream economics (e.g., Lee 2004 and Santos 2012 on experimental 
market economics; Sent 2004; Hands 2006, 2011; Heukelom 2012; Davis 2013a, 
2013b on behavioral economics).  
Our paper contributes to this second line of reflection: through the perspective 
explained above (i.e., from applied work to conceptual issues) we seek to illustrate 
how the important issue raised by Reiter (in the previous quote) about preferences and 
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efficiency is still pervasive today in applied microeconomics despite the impact of 
behavioral economics and the legitimization of experimental methods which have 
both participated to make key contributions on the endogeneity of preferences. 
A last element needs to be stressed: we take for granted that, at a foundational 
and conceptual level, notions of rationality are the ground of notions of efficiency in 
economics, as illustrated above by Sen’s emphasis on the role of rationality in the 
dual correspondence between Pareto optimality and competitive equilibrium and 
Reiter’s quote
3
.  
A first section illustrates how foundational and conceptual issues around 
rationality are materialized into three applied microeconomic contributions taken 
from radically different subfields of economics – the economics of discrimination, 
development economics and the economics of insurance. A second section discuss 
how these issues impact the world through the relationships between rationality, 
efficiency and policy recommendations, and at the same time reveal another set of 
ambiguities related to the foundational and conceptual issue of the distinction among 
interpersonal decisions, decisions under risk and uncertainty, and intertemporal 
decisions in economics. 
1. The impact of experimental methods on the relationships 
between rationality and efficiency in applied 
microeconomics 
 
“Increasingly, economists have turned to the experimental model of the 
physical science as a method to understand human behavior. Much of this 
research has taken the form of laboratory experiments in which volunteers 
enter a research lab to make decisions in a controlled environment. Over the 
past decade, economists have increasingly made use of field experiments to 
explore economic phenomena”. (Levitt and List, 2009, 2)   
                                                 
3
 This might be criticized from a set of reflections on the pioneering work of  Dhananjay Gode 
and  Shyam Sunder (1993) inspired by Gary Becker (1962), e.g., Phillip Mirowski (2002, p.551) and 
Ivan Moscati and Paola Tubaro (2011). However the ideas in these contributions have not impacted the 
mainstream of economic theory yet, at least not as much as experimental methods and behavioral 
economics have to this date.  
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 Experimental methods within economics take several forms, which can be 
difficult to distinguish. Nevertheless, such distinctions are necessary to really 
understand what experimental methods allow to show or to learn in economics. 
In this respect, Harrison and List (2004) offer a useful typology of 
experimental methods in economics. First, they define six criterions (ibid, p.1010): (1) 
the nature of the subject pool (economics students are viewed as the standard subject 
pool for experiments in economics); (2) the information that the subject has and the 
experience that the subject bring to the task; (3) the nature of the commodity involve 
in the experiment, whether it is virtual goods, or actual goods or services; (4) the 
nature of the task or the institutional rules, which are applied within the experiment; 
(5) the nature of the stakes; (6) the nature of the environment in which the subject 
operates. 
Based on these six criterions Harrison and List’s typology consists of four 
kinds of experiments:  
 
 “A conventional lab experiment is one that employs a standard subject pool of 
students, an abstract framing, and an imposed set of rules; 
 An artefactual field experiment is the same as conventional lab experiment but with a 
nonstandard subject pool; 
 A framed field experiment is the same as an artefactual field experiment but with 
field context in either the commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can 
use; 
 A natural field experiment is the same as a framed field experiment but where the 
environment is one where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the 
subjects do not know that they are in the experiment.” (Harrison and List, 2004, 
1013-1014)    
 
This section illustrates how experimental methods translate the relationships 
between rationality and efficiency in economics across these four types of 
experiments. To do so, we discuss a conventional lab experiment and an artefactual 
field experiment from the economics of discrimination (1.1), a framed field 
experiment from development economics (1.2), and a natural field experiment from 
the behavioral economics of insurance (1.3). Thus, we have three different 
backgrounds of both societal contexts and standard theoretical framework of 
microeconomics, that allow us to present some of the main results obtained from the 
use of experimental methods in economics around a plurality of applications. Finally, 
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we summarize the conceptual implications that we can draw from these three applied 
microeconomics works (1.4).  
1.1 Irrationality and Efficiency: Laboratory and artefactual 
experiments from the recent economics of discrimination 
In order to illustrate two types of experiments within Harrison and List’s 
typology – conventional lab and artefactual experiments – we discuss two 
experiments from the economics of discrimination.  
Discrimination became a political issue in the wake of the civil right 
movement after the WW2 in US and with the development of the Women’s 
Movement in US and Europe. In 1964, the Civil Right Act outlawed major forms of 
discrimination (against racial, ethnic, national and religious minorities, and women) 
and officially ended the institutional segregation – that governed racial relations along 
the “separate but equal” since 1896. Discrimination has a variety of “definitions” 
(discrimination in hiring process, income disparity etc.) and of “contents” (gender, 
race, age, etc.).  
In standard economics of discrimination
4
, the two main models are, on the one 
hand, Becker’s (1957) model based on a “taste for discrimination”, and, on the other 
hand, Arrow (1972) and Phelps’(1972) models of “statistical discrimination”, based 
on beliefs, stereotypes and signal effect. Beginning in the 1970s, wage decomposition 
methods
5
 became the bulk of empirical work on discrimination (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca, 1973). In the 1980s, the development of experimental methods in economics 
criticized wage differentials models (Yinger, 1981, 1986). As discrimination is an 
unobservable phenomenon, experimentalist criticism were directed to the indirect 
aspect of wage differentials analysis, which assimilates discrimination to gun smoke 
but says nothing on who pulls the trigger and how and why the shot was fired off. 
Experimentalists, on the other hand, claimed to be able to make discrimination 
visible.     
                                                 
4
 For a review of feminist approaches, see Figart (1997); for a survey on “heterodox” 
approaches, see Marshall (1974). 
5
 Models suppose equal wages for identical productive endowments; meaning all individuals 
“convert” productivity variables – diplomas, years of labor experience – into effects on wages5. 
Discrimination coefficients represent wage differentials between two demographic groups that remain 
unexplained after controlling for productivity variables. 
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Adida, Laitin and Valfort’s (2010; 2011) work on discrimination against the 
“Muslim minority” in France is methodologically representative of the recent 
economics of discrimination in that it contains wage differentials analysis, 
supplemented by conventional lab experiments and an artefactual field experiment. 
The political background that motivates their work is based on two “facts”: prejudices 
against Muslim are wide spread in Western countries, and the Muslim share of the 
population will grow in European countries. Thus “[g]iven these demographic trends, 
how will anti-Muslim prejudice evolve over the next decades?” translates in “will 
rooted Westerners be more or less generous toward Muslims as Muslim numbers 
around them increase (what we call Muslim out-group salience)?” (Adida et al., 2011, 
p.2). 
Their (standard) wage differentials analysis is based on a data set from a 
survey on 466 households from Senegalese Serer and Joola origin
6
. The analysis 
shows that “Muslim households” earn 400€ less in average compared to “Christians” 
ones (Adida et. al. 2010). Their experimental work then seeks to understand how such 
discrepancy is actually an outcome of discrimination. 
Their artefactual field experiment is based on an audit testing using CV
7
. In a 
later working paper, the authors replicate the audit testing into two conventional lab 
experiments using a “dictator game
8
” (Adida et. al. 2011). The first dictator game 
consists in screening pictures of people associated with a name. People on the picture 
are not present in the room and the participants are asked how much they are willing 
to transfer to these “faces”, which are associated with “Muslim” sound-like names, or 
with “Christian” sound-like name. Each participant has a 5€ allocation for each 
“face”. They could choose to keep the money, to give it all or to give a certain 
amount. They are told the pictures correspond to real person. The second dictator 
                                                 
6 Religion criteria is based on declaration by agents. “These immigrants belong to two etnico-
linguistic groups in Senegal, the Joolas and the Seres that are divided by religion, with one portion of 
them being Muslim and another portion being Christian. With the exception of religion, Senegalese 
Muslims and Senegalese Christians from these two ethno-linguistic groups are similar. They share the 
same culture and migrated to france in the same time period” (Adida, et al., 2011, p.2). See Adida, 
Laitin, Valfort, 2010 for the full identification strategy. In a French context, the study was discussed on 
the choice to test for religion criteria and not for ethnicity or national origin.    
7
 Audit testing are field experiments which mainly dealt with paired application of two 
candidates differing only on characteristics tested in the study (gender, race etc.). 
8
 The authors refers directly to the methodology offered by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 
(1986).  
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game tests for the role of contact related to discrimination especially among who they 
call “rooted French”
9
, referring explicitly to debate in psychology in the 1950s and 
1960s. The authors then replicate this second game after a sequence of 
“socialization
10
” between participants.  
These three experiments aim at make the gun smoke visible and measurable. 
The testing shows that an individual with a “Muslim sound-like” name on his CV has 
2.5 times less chance to be called by a recruiter. The first dictator game shows 
systematic transfer to other participants, with, however, a systematic inferior amount 
transferred to people associated with “Muslim names” compared to people with 
“Christian names”. The second dictator game shows that “Rooted French” do not 
display a “taste for discrimination” when they are surrounded by other “rooted 
French” but give significantly less to “Muslim Senegalese” when surrounded by 
participants “from other cultural backgrounds”. The authors label this result the 
“Hortefeux effect
11
”: discrimination is not reduced by contact with disliked group 
members. The replication was meant to interpret the “Hortefeux effect” through two 
theories: the “intergroup contact theory” (Allport 1954) based on the ignorance and 
misconception of others and the “group threat theory” (Blalock 1967) based on 
feelings to be jeopardized. In the first theory, contact is said to reduce discrimination, 
while the second one predicts an increase of discrimination when contact occurs. 
Since, in the replication of the second dictator game, the “contact” before the game 
does not reduce discrimination, the authors validate the second theory. Then, “the 
paper predicts that [the] demographic trend will increase anti-Muslim prejudice” and 
“call for solutions to anti-Muslim prejudice in the West” (Adida et al., 2011, p.1). 
The authors then build a model to undercover the rationale behind the 
“Hortefeux effect”: “[d]oes the Hortefeux effect emerge because FdS [rooted French] 
donors respond to changes in the behavior of non-FdS donors when SM [Senegalese 
                                                 
9
 The second part of the study concentrates on what the authors call “rooted French” 
(“Français de souche”), referring to “French citizens with four grandparents born inside metropolitan 
France” (Adida, Laitin, Valfort, [2011: 2]). This “objective” statistical category is not justified, and, by 
assumption, “rooted French” are supposed to discriminate more than other French citizens. 
10
 This “sequence of socialization” take the form of a “speed dating” of few minutes. The 
temporality taken into account is therefore very short term oriented.  
11
 In reference to a word by at the time French Minister of the Interior (Home Affairs) Brice 
Hortefeux  in France , “when there’s one, that’s ok; it’s when there’s a lot of them that there are 
problems” (Adida, Laitin, Valfort, [2011: 2]).  
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Muslim] numbers increase, or because FdS donors assign a lower weight to the well-
being of SM recipients when SM number increase?” (Adida et al., 2011, p.23). The 
rational model providing the two explanations of the decrease in “Rooted French” 
generosity is empirically tested (through the difference between what they give and 
what other players give) and does validate a preference-based explanation rather than 
a strategic explanation: “[in] other words, FdS donors are the only donors in the 
dictator game to change their behavior when Muslim numbers increase” (ibid., p.23). 
The FdS behavior may result from error in anticipating the others behaviors but the 
authors reject this hypothesis:   
“One could object that the Hortefeux effect arises because FdS donors 
wrongly anticipate that non-FdS donors change their donations when Muslim 
numbers increase. Although we do not have information on FdS actual beliefs 
about non-FdS reactions to SM out-group salience, we consider this 
assumption unrealistic. First, we know that FdS beliefs about other FdS 
reactions to SM out-group salience (as compared to SX [Senegalese 
Christians] out-group salience) are correct, which is not consistent with FdS 
misreading other players’ behavior. Second, our FdS players stem from the 
ethnically diverse 19th district in Paris. They therefore have many 
opportunities outside the lab to update their beliefs about non-FdS (and 
notably Muslim’) behavior when Muslim numbers increase. If they fail to do 
so, we believe that this should be attributed to their anti-Muslim prejudice 
that is exacerbated in that context and therefore prevents them from 
interacting productively with Muslims” (Adida et al., 2011, p23).     
Therefore, they concludes that “based on a rational model and an empirical 
test of the mechanisms this model uncovers, we identify that the Hortefeux effect 
derives from an activation of FdS taste-based discrimination against Muslims when 
Muslims members increase” (ibid., p.26). As in Becker’s model, consistence between 
actual behavior and rationality is maintained by referring to agent’s preference. 
However, in Adida et. al.’s lab experiments, systematic transfer to “pictures” is in 
contradiction with standard rationality (maximizing money profit) as the authors 
point out
12
. Furthermore, in the Beckerian framework that the authors use in the 
interpretations of their results, systematic inferior amounts transferred to members of 
specific group – discrimination per se – has no economic justification in terms of 
economic efficiency, apart from being described as a result of “personal taste” 
                                                 
12
 “In experimental economics, the dictator game provides compelling evidence for other-
regarding preferences challenging the homo oeconomicus postulate, which predicts that the donor 
should not give anything of his initial endowment to the recipient. Indeed, Forsythe, Horowitz and 
Sefton (1994) show that 80% of their subjects choose to give a strictly positive share of their initial 
endowment, with 20% choosing to divide this endowment equally. Reviewing eleven results from 
dictator games, Camerer (2003) reveals the generality of this finding, as the mean offer range drom 
10% to 52%”. (Adida et al., 2011, p.3).    
 11 
(Becker, 1957,). Indeed, on Becker’s account, “tastes for discrimination” are 
formalized as a cost playing the role of a tariff in a trade model. Nonetheless, in 
Adida et. al.’s lab experiments, systematic inferior amount given to members of a 
disliked group do imply greater money profit in this specific interaction, compared to 
other interaction with other group; hence at the individual level, discriminatory 
behavior clearly is efficient.  
1.2 Rationality and Inefficiency: A framed field experiment in 
development economics 
To illustrate the third kind of experiments within Harrison and List’s typology, 
we discuss a framed field experiment from development economics; more precisely, 
the experiment in question is a randomized experiment, the most representative kind 
of framed field experiment in economics  
With the collapse of the Washington Consensus
13
 at the beginning of the 
1990s, the question of the development aid became very vivid.  Two camps, the pro-
aid one and the anti-aid, started a strong debate on this issue. The leading researcher 
in the pro-aid camp is Jeffrey Sachs (2005) who advocates a massive aid plan in order 
to allow the poor to escape from poverty traps. In the anti-aid camp, the leading 
researcher is William Easterly (2006), who criticizes the pro-aid camp as being just a 
continuity of occidental imperialism from the West. Explicitly advocating itself as a 
third way in this debate, the J-PAL, a famous laboratory in development economics 
based at the MIT led by Esther Duflo and Abhijhit Banrjee, promotes the use of 
randomized experiments in order to collect evidences concerning aid efficiency. This 
subsection focuses on the latter’s randomized experiments, after having briefly 
sketched the (pre-J-PAL) standard theoretical framework of development economics. 
The economies of developing countries are highly dependent on agricultural 
rather than manufactory production. In 1964, Theodore Schultz published his famous 
book, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, in which he developed a neoclassical 
                                                 
13
 In the beginning of the 1980s the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed 
to developing countries a set of structural policies in order to stabilize and develop their economies. 
This set of structural policies was called “Washington consensus” by John Williamson (1990, 2003). 
This set of structural policies was a social and economic failure (see Jolly et al.,1987; see also Stiglitz 
2002 for an analysis of the related social cost along with a strong criticisms of these economic policies; 
see also World Bank 2005 and Rodrik 2006 more detailed conclusions) 
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theoretical framework for understanding poverty that became the standard framework 
in development economics. The main idea developed by Schultz is summarized in his 
motto ‘poor but efficient’. In other words, poor people manage to make efficient use 
of their few resources. The work of Schultz mainly focused on agriculture in 
developing countries, and contradicted the main position on this field around the 
1950s. During this period the agriculture in developing countries was perceived with a 
null marginal product because of tradition and culture, and the idea was to move labor 
from agriculture to industry. On Schultz’s account, considering the circumstances in 
which they live, poor people do the best they can: if they are not productive it is only 
because they cannot be so. 
More recently and with respect to agricultural problems in development 
economics, it has been noticed that farmers in developing countries do not use 
fertilizers which would produce higher returns. Duflo did a randomized experiment in 
Kenya with Michael Kremer and Jonathan Robinson (Duflo et al., 2011) in order to 
understand what can be done to make farmers use fertilizers. The persistence of low 
agricultural harvest in Africa is commonly interpreted as resulting from the low 
adoption of fertilizers. Hence the question is: why are fertilizers not adopted by the 
poor when it can substantially increase their agricultural production? Duflo et al. 
chose to test an answer to this question which is inspired by the growing behavioral 
economics literature on intertemporal choices: the behavior of the poor are driven by 
“timing and impatience” (J-PAL, Policy Briefcase 2011, 4).  During the harvest 
season, when farmers have enough money to buy fertilizers in advance for the next 
season they do not do so and buy something else, hence when the next season arrives, 
famers do not have enough money to buy fertilizers.  
 In collaboration with an International NGO (ICS
14
), the authors tested a 
specific program through a randomized experiment, which belong to the framed field 
experiment category of Harrison and List (2004). The « Savings and Fertlizer 
Initiative Program » (SAFI) aimed to improve the use of fertilizers by facilitating the 
purchase of fertilizers for the farmers. Basically, in order to reduce farmers’ 
procrastination, an officer visited the farmers and gave them the possibility to buy the 
fertilizers just after the harvest season. The experiment was hold in Kenya from 2003 
                                                 
14
 International Child Support (ICS) is a Kenyan NGO which aims to promote development programs 
to improve the life of children.  
 13 
to 2004, so that it lasted for two seasons. The farmers who were allowed to participate 
to the experiment were randomly divided in two groups: a treatment group which 
receives the SAFI program, i.e., the visit of the officer, and a control group which 
does not receive the SAFI program. During the second season, the experimental 
design was enriched. Three groups were added to the initial experimental design. The 
first added group was constituted by a new set-up of farmers randomly selected to 
receive the initial SAFI program. The second added group of farmers received the 
SAFI program with ex ante choice of timing, i.e., they were visited before the harvest 
and had the possibility to say when they wanted to be visited again later. In the third 
added group, the farmers were visited just before when they were suppose to apply 
the fertilizers to the crops.  
Dufflo et. al. (2011) drew three main conclusions from this experiment: (1) the 
SAFI program increases the use of fertilizers but only on the duration of the 
experiment; (2) many farmers are conscious of the difficulty that they have to save 
money for fertilizers; (3) there is no evidence of “impulsive purchasing” – such as 
alcohol or tobacco – as the authors were wondering (Duflo et al., 2011, 2376). 
This experiment clearly challenges the standard theoretical framework of 
Schultz. Conversely to Schultz’s theory, Duflo et al. (2011) show that poor people are 
not on the productive efficiency frontier, in other words they are not efficient. The 
poor are not efficient because they are not using fertilizers, which can increase 
consequently their agricultural productions and therefore they are not on their 
productive efficiency frontier. The main issue seems to be that the poor do not arrive 
to be on this frontier because, in the example of fertilizers, they face many difficulties 
to save. These difficulties are mainly explained by the fact that:   
 
“being poor almost certainly affects the way people think and decide. Perhaps when choices 
involve the subsistence of one’s family, trade-offs are distorted in different ways than when 
the question is how much money one will enjoy at retirement. Pressure by extended family 
members or neighbors is also stronger when they are at risk of starvation. Or, decision making 
may be influenced by stress.” (Duflo, 2006b pp.376-377) 
 
For Duflo, poverty changes the decision making process of individuals in a 
way that leads to inefficient decisions. Poor people are rational but the complexity of 
their livese imply  inefficient behaviors. In consequence, Duflo aims to define a new 
 14 
research agenda and therefore to develop “a new paradigm, ‘poor but neoclassical’” 
(Duflo, 2006b, p.367). That is to say, that the poor are not efficient, as Schultz 
emphasized, but they are rational. They do the best they can do, considering the 
difficulties they face, but it leads them to inefficient choices. 
1.3 Irrationality and Inefficiency: a natural experiment from the 
behavioral economics of insurance 
Finally, we illustrate the last type of experiment within Harrison and List’s 
typology, a natural field experiment from the behavioral economics of insurance.  
The early 1990s United States saw the beginning of national debates on the 
economic consequences of deregulation with respect to the increase in lawsuits (Jost 
1992, Frayssé 1995; see also Marciano and Medema 2013 for a broader history of 
economic thought perspective). A small part of these debates concerned the strong 
price increase in auto insurance (i.e. in insurance premiums). The three main positions 
in the debate over auto insurance prices were that (1) insurance companies were 
abusing consumers, or (2) consumers had an excessive tendency to go to court, or (3) 
there was too much regulation if the prices were not due to a temporary market 
fluctuation
15
. In order to please these three parties:  
 
“A number of states have changed or are considering changing their automobile 
liability insurance laws to give consumers more choice […]. One approach to 
reform that has gained favorable attention in several states is to give motorists a 
choice between a “full-priced” policy that includes the right to sue for any auto-
related injury and a less expensive policy that places certain restrictions on the 
right to sue. With restricted rights, motorists may sue for pain and suffering 
when they sustain severe injuries in an accident, but they may not sue for pain 
and suffering if their injuries are not serious. In all cases, they can still sue for 
economic damages and medical costs.” Johnson et. al. (2000, p.235, our 
emphasis) 
 
 
In standard economics of insurance, consumers’ choices among policies are 
conceptualized through expected utility theory, which is considered to be both a 
descriptive and a normative theory of rational choice under risk and uncertainty. The 
only constraint that expected utility theory puts on consumers’ rationality is 
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 For contemporary accounts of the problem see Anderson, Heaton and Carroll (2010; RAND 
2010 for a summary) and Insurance Information Institute (2013); we do not discuss these accounts here 
since we are interested in Johnson et. al.’s account of the problem at the time (i.e., early 1990s) and the 
contrast they make between their approach and the standard economics of insurance’s (cf., infra).  
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consistency, i.e., a consumer is either risk seeker, or risk neutral, or risk averse, at 
least for a given decision problem. Insurance markets exist primarily because of risk 
averse consumers. By virtue of the law of large numbers, insurance companies are 
able to make a profit out of insuring risk-averse consumers
16
. Insurance companies’ 
premiums (i.e., prices) are supposed to match consumers’ willingness to pay (i.e., 
degree of risk aversion), and the only sources of inefficiencies underlying this schema 
are to be found in the potential rigidities to the profit maximizing behavior of 
insurance companies, which are (Arrow 1963, quoted by Johnson et. al. 2000, p. 225): 
(1) moral hazard (individuals undergoing greater risks because they subscribed an 
insurance policy), (2) adverse selection (asymmetrical information between the 
insurer and the consumer), and (3) transaction costs (searching for an insurance 
company, filling the paper work, failure to borrow to insure against something one 
would want to etc.). Each is a by-product of consumers’ rational behaviors, i.e., it is 
in their interest to behave as such. 
The contribution of Johnson et. al. (2000) consists in showing that there are 
inefficiencies in the insurance market which are not due to either one of the latter 
three causes. Regarding the case discussed above, they remarked that, in states where 
auto insurances are compulsory by law, when the limited right policy is introduced it 
has to be either set as the default insurance policy, or as the alternative insurance 
policy. Johnson et. al. (2000) notice that a theoretical implication of the standard 
economics of insurance framework is that “[t]he choice between the two options 
(wealth and budget aside), should be the same whether consumer currently has the 
right to sue or the limited right” (ibid, p.235).  
In 1992, the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where auto-insurance is 
compulsory, introduced a limited right policy respectively as the alternative option 
and as the default option. Observing the discrepancy in choices between consumers in 
Pennsylvania and consumers in New Jersey (through the data made available in 
Insurance Information Institute 1992) constituted a natural experiment to test for the 
theoretical implication of standard economics of insurance mentioned above (i.e., the 
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 For the law of large number to enable insurance company to pursue profit maximization the 
risks against which risk-averse consumers insured themselves have to be heterogeneous (diversified 
types of risks) and independent (non-correlated risky events). 
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non-impact of alternative versus default setting of an option on consumers’ choices)
17
. 
The results of the natural experiment were that: when the limited right policy was set 
as the default option (in New Jersey), 80% of the drivers chose to stay with this 
policy, although when it was set as the alternative option (in Pennsylvania), only 25% 
of the drivers chose to shift toward this policy. They concluded from this natural 
experiment that this pattern of choices contradicted the non-impact of default option 
predicted in the standard economics of insurance, which had  
 
“significant economic consequences. […] If we assume that Pennsylvanians 
would have adopted limited tort as the same frequency as New Jersey residents, 
if limited tort had been the default, Pennsylvanians would have paid over $200 
million dollars less for auto insurance.” (Johnson et. al. 2000, p.238).  
 
The authors did not interpret this inefficiency as being the result of moral 
hazard, adverse selection or transaction cost, but of consumers’ violations of expected 
utility theory (EUT). More precisely, they emphasized two interrelated violations: (1) 
consumers’ preferences were not defined over objective and absolute outcomes (in 
contradiction with the definition of a preference structure in EUT), because (2) 
consumers gave economic weight to the economically irrelevant fact that an option is 
either an alternative or a default (in contradiction with the principle of EUT 
maximization in standard insurance economics). They argued that these deviations are 
systematic in insurance problems, as they illustrated with other laboratory 
experiments throughout their paper and other references to behavioral decision 
research and behavioral economics. They specifically relied on Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky’s concepts of framing and loss aversion to predict and explain the 
observed patterns of choice. Research on ‘framing’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 
1986; Kahneman and Tversky 1984) show that subjective perceptions (or 
representations) of outcomes do not necessarily match their objective presentation, 
i.e., a gain can be seen as a loss and a loss can be seen as a gain. In the natural 
experiment case discussed above, this suggests that when the limited right is set by 
default, consumers are more likely to see the premium difference with the full right (a 
monetary loss); whereas when the full right is set by default, consumers are more 
likely to see the benefit difference with the limited right (a monetary gain). Basically, 
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 They challenge this implication by means of paper-and-pencils laboratory experiments that 
were conducted before the natural experiment, which confirm their laboratory results (the effects are 
indeed stronger in the real marker). We do not discuss the relationships between natural and laboratory 
experiments in Johnson et. al.’s paper in this section. 
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loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991, 1992) is 
the idea that the disutility from a loss is (usually around two times) greater than the 
utility from a gain of the same absolute value. In the case discussed above, this would 
explain why, once the options ‘framed’ (as ‘alternative’ and ‘default’), less consumers 
changed when the limited right is set by default (in New Jersey). 
1.4 Do experimental methods in economics imply greater 
conceptual ambiguities between rationality and efficiency?  
Taken from different subfields of economics and using different types of 
experimental methods in economics, the three applied microeconomic studies 
discussed in the previous subsections highlight three different relationships between 
rationality and efficiency at the individuals’ level. The interpretations of the authors 
were that discriminators’ behaviors are irrational and efficient, poor farmers’ 
behaviors are rational and inefficient, and insurance consumers’ behaviors are 
irrational and inefficient. How are we to explain these different relationships at a 
conceptual level? As we have seen in introduction, (1) on a standard account 
rationality is suppose to imply efficiency but (2) the foundational issues underlying 
rationality in economics are ambiguous. Hence, are we to attribute the three different 
relationships between rationality and efficiency highlighted in the previous sections to 
an ‘interplay among ambiguities’ so to speak? 
On the rationality issue, one could argue that consistency of choices and self-
interest maximization were intertwined in each study. Consistency of choices 
concerning the amounts of money to give to other people was related to self-interest 
maximization of monetary gains, consistency of choices concerning the use of 
fertilizers was related to self-interest-maximization of harvesting, and consistency of 
choices of insurance policy was related to self-interest-maximization of expected 
monetary gains. Since the authors were not explicit about which underlying view of 
rationality they were taking as primitive in their experiments, the ambiguity at the 
foundational level investigated in introduction crystallizes in these applied 
microeconomics’ contributions. The ambiguity of the descriptive/positive versus 
normative/prescriptive status of rationality was also present in these contributions 
since the authors made claims about the efficiency of individual behaviors. However, 
as we have also discussed in introduction, methodological individualism requires 
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rationality to be understood at the individual level, but only for the sake of 
understanding higher aggregated/market/social phenomena. This means that the 
efficiency issues are to be understood at a higher level than the individual one. 
Clearly, the interpretational issues concerning rationality in economics, which 
are well known and well discussed at a foundational/conceptual and theoretical level 
(cf. introduction) crystallizes into in the applied microeconomists’ contributions we 
have scrutinized. It is understandable that these issues are not explicitly discussed 
within the contributions we have considered since it is not the purpose of applied 
microeconomics to tackle foundational/conceptual issues that are not even settled at 
the proper level of investigation. However, in the next section we try to make the case 
that there is no such a thing as a ‘proper level of investigation’ for the 
foundational/conceptual issues around rationality in economics, because a full 
understanding of these issues require an investigation from what economists are 
actually doing in the world.  
2. From economic policies to economic theory and the three 
pillars of economic rationality 
 
In line with a recent set of reflections (Putnam and Walsh 2012; see also Davis 
2013a, 2013b), we claim that a full understanding of the foundational/conceptual 
issues facing economics cannot overlook the fact that economics is political – 
implicitly so when economists claim to do ‘economics’ and explicitly so when they 
claim to do ‘political economics’ (e.g. Putnam and Walsh 2012 and the references 
therein). From this reflexive perspective on economics, three methodological 
implications follow quite straightforwardly with respect to our approach from applied 
microeconomics to foundational and conceptual issues: (1) the notions of efficiency 
and rationality are to be considered as norms, of evaluation and of behavior 
respectively, (2) these norms have to be understood at the very applied level 
complementarily to the foundational/conceptual and theoretical levels at which they 
are most often discussed, and (3) that the ambiguities around economic rationality and 
efficiency are to be analyzed at the level of policy recommendation.  
This section shows how economic rationality grounds economic efficiency, 
thus yielding policy recommendations. In this respect, we seek to make an 
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analytically fruitful use of the (small) emphasize we did put on the theoretical (i.e., 
historically internal) and societal (i.e., historically external) dimensions of the applied 
microeconomic contributions scrutinized. To do so, we first discuss the relationships 
between economic rationality, economic efficiency and policy recommendation in 
these contributions (2.1). Because the notions of rationality underlying each 
experiments rely solely upon one of the three dimension of rational economic 
behaviors – other regarding preferences, intertemporal preferences and preferences 
for risk and uncertainty – when then move to the conceptual and foundational level to 
argue that the lack of theoretical relationships among these dimensions in economics 
prevent a complete understanding of the social phenomena that these experiments and 
the related policy recommendations aimed to tackle (2.2).  
 
2.1 From economic policies to economic theory 
Recall that the experiments discussed previously referred to specific societal 
problems: discrimination against “Muslims” in western countries, foreign aid to 
eradicate poverty in developing agricultural economy, and the economic drawbacks of 
deregulation for auto-insurance markets in the U.S. The three applied microeconomic 
contributions scrutinized in the previous section share a common intellectual pattern 
that we are going to investigate in this subsection: there is a problem “out there” in 
society that represents a puzzle for standard theoretical frameworks of economic 
theory which cannot propose clear policy recommendation and experimenters tries to 
collect evidence to understand better what’s going on and then propose policy 
guidelines that embody standard notions of rationality and efficiency but non standard 
relationships between these notions. 
In order to make this point explicit, we will first, investigate the policy 
guidelines that each microeconomic contribution proposes implicitly or explicitly 
(2.1.1). Then we will show that these policy guidelines rest upon notions of efficiency 
which are grounded on solely one of the three pillars of economic rationality – other 
regarding preferences or intertemporal preferences or preferences for risk and 
uncertainty (2.1.2). 
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2.1.1 From policy recommendations to economic efficiency 
 
Discrimination  
 
If discrimination is rational but inefficient in standard economics of 
discrimination, the resulting political recommendations are much more complex. In 
the standard models of discrimination, the policy recommendations are: “Laissez-
faire” according to Becker’s model, or improvement of information on the market and 
policies focusing on “pre-market” factors – essentially education – according to 
Arrow/Phelps’s theories.  
No such recommendation is drawn in the experiments studied, in which 
discriminatory behaviors were rational but inefficient. Even if the results of Adida et 
al. (2011) corroborated Becker’s standard theory of discrimination, the policy 
recommendations they draw are modest and pessimistic but do not rely on “laissez-
faire” and market solutions: 
 
“Solution to discrimination against Muslims is of urgent concern. As shown by 
Paluck and green (2009), evidence on prejudice-reducing policies is at best 
inconclusive, such that there is so far no efficient intervention to fight against 
anti-Muslim discrimination. We hope that the search for policies that work 
effectively to reduce anti-Muslim prejudice will be aided by our identification of 
one of the mechanisms – i.e. the activation of distaste toward Muslims by Muslim 
out-group salience – that sustain it” (ibid., p.27).   
Identifying a mechanism – the “Hortefeux effect” – underlines the existence of 
FdS’s taste-based discrimination: tastes or preferences “activated” in a specific 
context, i.e. increasing “Muslim” presence. These preferences are in contradiction 
with the anti-discrimination laws and have to be the focus of policies 
recommendations. Therefore, based on the experiments of Adida et al. the main 
policy recommendation which can be drawn is to target anti-social preferences.  
 
Poverty 
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The policy recommendation from Duflo et. al. is extremely clear: Duflo et al. 
recommend the program they tested – the SAFI program -- because it is the most 
efficient one: 
 
“A small “nudge” at the appropriate time was as powerful as a heavy subsidy – and 
may be a better policy [1]. Critics of fertilizers subsidies contend that they promote overuse of 
fertilizer, leading to environmental damage and ultimately reduced effectiveness. Large 
subsidies are also fiscally costly, typically regressive (benefiting the wealthiest farmers most), 
and often necessitate that the government get involved in fertilizer distribution. A SAFI-style 
program could reduce these negative side effects, since the smaller incentive would not 
promote overuse among farmers who are able to save money for fertilizer.  
To compare the relative desirability of heavy subsidies, a SAFI-style program, and 
no intervention [2], the researchers created a model to estimate which policy option delivers 
the highest welfare – i.e. which makes society as a whole better off. They find that a SAFI-
style program improves welfare relative to taking no policy action, and it may provide larger 
welfare gains than heavy subsidies [3].” (J-PAL, Policy Briefcase 2011, 4, our emphasis) 
 
Compare to heavy subsidies, which is highly recommended by some 
economist such as Frank Ellis (1992) or Jeffrey Sachs (2004), the SAFI program is 
considered to be more efficient by J-PAL researchers. The main reasons are that 
heavy subsidies can create an overuse of fertilizers and therefore cause environmental 
damages; furthermore a heavy subsidy is extremely costly for the government. That is 
why, for the same effect on the use of fertilizers, the authors promote the SAFI 
program [1].  
Randomized experiments allow comparing the control group (which receives 
no intervention) and the treatment group (which benefits from the SAFI program), in 
the light of Duflo et al. experiment, the J-Pal was able to show that the SAFI program 
has more efficient effects on the use of fertilizers compare to no intervention [2]. At 
the end, the authors conclude that the SAFI program is the intervention, which 
provides the “highest welfare” [3]. The policy recommendation appears here 
extremely clear: promoting the SAFI program. The reason is that this program offers 
the largest welfare compare to no intervention or heavy subsidies.  
 
Insurance  
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The policy recommendations made by Johnson et al. (2000) are rather implicit 
and in any case quite indirect. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw, from the experiment 
of Johnson et al., one specific policy recommendation: change the default option.The 
idea is, for the authors, to replace the default option by limited-tort policy and to place 
the full right policy as an alternative option 
 
“In Pennsylvania, just as in New Jersey, limited-tort policies were offered in 
order to provide economic relief to many of the consumers who felt 
overburdened by high automobile insurance rates [1].” (p.240) 
“The considerably lower premium associated with the limited-tort policy was 
designed to encourage consumers to take advantage of this option. However, 
status-quo framing apparently led many drivers to accept the default option, 
even though it was more expensive than the alternative. Framing thus had a 
systematic and predictable effects on market behavior that produced significant 
economic consequences [2].” (p.240) 
 
Standard economics of insurance’s normative policy recommendations to 
repair these failures (lowering prices by expanding the range of choices available to 
consumers) have been implemented [1]. However these implementations have not 
repaired the market failures [2]  
It is interesting to notice a non-trivial fact concerning the contemporary 
scientific context of applied microeconomics. Johnson et al. (2000) has been 
instrumental in the rise of libertarian paternalism and other behavioral welfare 
economics related research program. The original paper was initially published in 
1993, and, although it treated a very contemporary question of the time, it had a rather 
weak impact in the literature until the rise of libertarian paternalism in the early 2000s 
as shown by the following graph (taken from Google Scholar): 
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Interestingly, Johnson et al. (2000) and other related work in behavioral 
economics of insurance had a rather limited impact on auto-insurance regulations 
(Anderson, Heaton and Carroll 2010, p. 137),  e.g., default and alternative options 
have not switched in Pennsylvania (see also Insurance Information Institute 2013). 
However, along with Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Johnson et. al. (2000) is 
practically always referenced to ground policy recommendations by behavioral 
economists based on default options in varied market and non-market areas. The 
reason is quite explicit in these policy recommendations: both Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988) and Johnson et. al. (2000) have demonstrated the power of default 
options by means of natural experiments, the former concerning intertemporal 
preferences for retirement savings, the latter concerning preferences under risk and 
uncertainty for auto-insurance.  
 
From these three microeconomics contributions, three different policies 
recommendations have been drawn. The first one aims to focus on the preferences of 
the agent – discrimination. The second and the third one propose a nudge device in 
order to improve the use of fertilizer and to reduce market failures – in the case of 
insurance. All of these recommendations focus on the behavior of the agent and try to 
orient it.  
 
2.1.2 From economic efficiency to economic rationality 
 
These three policy recommendations are grounded on criteria of economic 
efficiency. Here, we try to briefly identify the nature of these criteria of efficiency and 
how they are grounded on economic rationality. 
 
Discrimination  
 
Using Becker and statistical theories of discrimination, market mechanism 
were said to eliminate discrimination essentially because discrimination was rational 
(consistent with taste), but inefficient (a cost). In Becker’s model, firms with taste for 
discrimination are eliminated by firms with no taste for discrimination, essentially 
because the later face inferior cost.  
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In alternative narratives (e.g. Arrow, 1972, 1998), discrimination is described 
as a result of imperfect information available to agents. The agents anticipate a 
specific economic characteristic to be correlated with a group affiliation and made 
probabilistic judgment on the probability that this correlation is true for a particular 
individual they interact with. Here, the efficiency question (at an individual or firm 
level) depends on the veracity of the anticipation. Therefore, in statistical 
discrimination models, discrimination reflects an error of productivity perception and  
is therefore eliminated by learning effect. Discrimination is sustainable only if it 
interacts with real differences in productivity.  
In the experiment of Adida et al., the rationale of the agents’ behavior relies 
on a taste-based (preference) explanation. However, contrary to Becker’s model 
where having a taste and being able to pay for it is still rational though inefficient, in 
the experiment, discrimination is efficient because profitable to individuals who 
commit it (monetary gains and utility maximization according to their preference). 
 
Poverty 
 
Let us, now, turn on the underlying criterion of efficiency within the framed 
experiment on fertilizers. As we have pointed out, the SAFI program is recommended 
by the authors because it the program which allow the highest welfare. But the 
authors do not clearly define what they mean by highest welfare. 
However, the authors give a path, the highest welfare should be considered as 
the welfare “which makes the society as a whole better off” (J-PAL, Policy Briefcase 
2011, 4).  But which society is considered here? The farmers? The farmers plus the 
rest of the population? What is taken into account? The notion of the “whole society” 
can refer to two dimensions: 1) The better off for each individual who constitutes the 
society, or 2)The average better off for the society. 
The first ambiguity is to determine whether the society as a whole expresses 
the welfare of each of its constitutive individuals or if it refers to the sum of 
individuals and in that perspective do not focus on individual level. The second 
ambiguity is the meaning of welfare. The use of fertilizer, because it can generate 
high returns, will imply more income for the farmers. Is that the implicit definition of 
welfare? The only dimension evaluated by the experiment is the use of fertilizer, is 
that to say that the use of fertilizer is the end, and describe the welfare? Or is it a 
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mean for a higher welfare? What the authors consider as a clue for efficiency is what 
they test, that is to say the use of fertilizer with respect to intertemporal choice of use 
of fertilizers. The efficiency, here, is pretty explicit. However, the norm below this 
efficiency is implicit. 
 
Insurance  
 
Johnson et. al. (2000) do not, again, really define what is the economic 
efficiency underlying their recommendation for a change of frame, i.e., of default 
option. They evoke only once the notion of efficiency in their experiment:  
 
“If consumers exhibit systematic biases, insurance markets may fail to operate 
efficiently.” (p.239) 
 
Generally speaking, standard economics of insurance do not take into account 
well documented psychological mechanisms in the normative models of choice that 
underlie their normative criterion of economic efficiency, which relies instead solely 
on economic factors. While, descriptive models can be used to inform policy makers, 
firms and consumers of the discrepancy between what they ought to do to attain 
economic efficiency and what they are actually doing. 
Roughly speaking, given that (a) there is an agreement on the highest level of 
auto-insurance prices (b) it is possible to decreases these prices by introducing 
cheaper insurance policies and that (c) consumers are prone to systematic 
psychological biases which make them not choosing the cheapest policy against their 
interests because they have inconsistent preferences for risk and uncertainty, then (d) 
it is better to put the cheapest policy as a default option so as to maximize consumer 
surplus. Therefore the notion of efficiency into the authors seem to refer is linked to 
the one of neoclassical framework. That is to say, the one that focuses on surplus 
analysis in order to promote the Pareto efficiency situation.  
 
 Through these different experiments, we searched the invisible definition of 
efficiency that supplanted the different policies recommendations we illustrated. In 
each case, this definition does not appear clearly. As economic efficiency is supposed 
to be grounded in economic rationality, we next investigates the causes of the lack of 
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clarity on the former by investigating the latter on a more conceptual and foundational 
level, without losing sight of the field so to speak.  
2.2 Appraising the three pillars of economic rationality 
We have seen that the theoretical problems faced by the applied 
microeconomics contributions we have scrutinized collapse into questions of other-
regarding preferences, intertemporal preferences, and preferences for risk and 
uncertainty. The references discussed in introduction (Blume and Easly 2008 and Sen 
2008) do stress that the foundational/conceptual ambiguities around rationality 
(consistency of choices versus self-interest maximization and descriptive/positive 
versus normative/prescriptive status) carry over to the work on interpersonal 
decisions
18
 and to the work on decisions under risk and uncertainty
19
 in economics 
and in behavioral economics (Blume and Easly 2008, p.10 and pp.2-3 resp.; Sen 
2008, pp.4-5 and pp.8-11 resp.). It is fair to say that the same remark applies to 
intertemporal decisions
20
 (e.g., Vallois 2011, 2012). As stress by both Blume and 
Easly (ibid) and Sen (ibid), these ambiguities (at least slightly) fade away in decision 
theory which is more concerned with individual contra social outcomes of decisions.  
One could argue that in economics, behavioral economics and decision theory, 
the analytical specialization around these three pillars of rationality has enhanced our 
                                                 
18
From Gary Becker’s (1976) discussion of “enlightened self-interest” there has been a huge 
literature (and debates) on the conception and conceptualization of other-regarding preferences in 
economics, behavioral economics and decision theory (e.g., Muramatsu 2006, chap. 7 for a detailed 
discussion).   
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 From John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) along with Leonard Savage 
(1954)’s axiomatizations of expected utility theory under risk and uncertainty respectively, and John 
Pratt (1964) and Arrow’s (1965) operationalizations of expected utility theory to measure risk attitudes 
in microeconomics, there has been a huge literature (and debates) on the conception and 
conceptualization of preferences for risk and uncertainty in economics, behavioral economics and 
decision theory (e.g., Muramatsu 2006, chap.6 for a detailed discussion) 
20
 From the seminal contribution of Paul Samuelson (1937) on exponentially discounted utility 
along with the one of Robert Strotz (1955) on impatience, there has been a huge literature (and debates) 
on intertemporal preferences in economics, behavioral economics and decision theory (e.g., Muramatsu 
2006, chap.5 for a detailed discussion). 
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understanding of individual behaviors with respect to ‘time’, ‘other people’ and ‘the 
unknown’, to use terms that stress the commonsensical strength of the analytical 
distinction. We have previously emphasized  how notions of rationality are the ground 
of notions of efficiency in economics, which altogether are the ground of policy 
recommendation. Therefore, it is not so surprising that the rise of experimental 
methods in applied microeconomics has changed  the relationship between  rationality 
and efficiency through a better understanding of the nature of the three pillars that 
constitute the former.  
However, given the complex social issues into which policy recommendations 
are embedded (as we have illustrated), one could question whether it is warranted to 
base policy recommendation solely on one of the three pillars. In other words and to 
illustrate with the cases we have discussed  previously, is it warranted to consider 
only ‘other people’ and not ‘time’ and/or ‘the unknown’ to fight discrimination? Is it 
warranted to consider only ‘time’ and not ‘other people’ and/or ‘the unknown’ to fight 
poverty? Is it warranted to consider only ‘the unknown’ and not ‘time’ and/or ‘other 
people’ to regulate the insurance market? We think that, in each case, this is not 
totally warranted. 
 
The three pillars of economic rationality with respect to discrimination 
First, consider the two main frameworks from which considerations of 
efficiency are derived in economics of discrimination. The ‘taste-based’ framework of 
Becker holds that discrimination stems from specific other-regarding (anti-social) 
preferences that are rational but not efficient at the market level. The statistical 
framework of Arrow and Phelps holds that discrimination stems from probabilistic 
judgments made by the economic agent about the odds that the individuals they are 
interacting with share the economic characteristic correlated with a specific group 
affiliation; in other words, the economic agent first form a subjective probability that 
an individual has some economic characteristic, and then make his economic decision 
according to his risk attitude. In both frameworks, discriminatory behaviors are 
rational:  De gustibus non est disputandum for Becker, and economic agents’ risk 
attitude are suppose to be consistent for Arrow and Phelps. The only two explanations 
we have of the (economic dimension of the) complex social phenomena of 
discrimination are either in terms of one pillar of rationality or the other but not both. 
Note that expected utility theory, which grounds the Arrow/Phelps framework, 
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contains what is called in decision theoretic terms an independence axiom, which 
technically ensure that the rationality of an agent entails the independence between 
his preferences (tastes) and his probabilistic judgments (beliefs), so as to prevent 
wishful thinking and other types of irrational behaviors (e.g. MacCrimmon and 
Larsson 1979 for a detailed discussion). When Arrow (1972) said that discrimination 
is the result of cognitive biases, it means that (technically) economic agents who 
discriminate do not respect the independence axiom, i.e., they let their tastes influence 
their beliefs. In this case the rationality of the phenomenon does not hold anymore, 
though for different reasons than the ones discussed by Adida et al.. It has to be 
noticed that the latter also stick to a univocal interpretation of their results: 
discrimination has to be either a problem of preferences or a problem of belief 
formation (i.e. subjective probability). It is striking to see how the analytical 
distinction between the pillars of economic rationality carries over to applied 
microeconomics work, even when the authors appeal to the methodology of 
behavioral economics (they quote Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986 concerning 
the dictator design they are using) and refer to literatures that are quite external to 
economics (the social psychology of Allport and the sociology of Blalock). But 
behavioral economics severely challenges the actual (descriptive/positive) relevance 
of the independence axiom (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and more recent 
work in social psychology makes it quite clear that discrimination cannot be a 
problem, even in its economic dimension, explainable only in terms of one of the 
three pillars of economic rationality without considering their interactions. Note that 
some account of discrimination in social psychology especially emphasizes the 
importance of ‘time’ in the interplay between beliefs about ‘the unknown’ and tastes 
about ‘the others’ – e.g., the conditions that are suppose to hold in contemporary 
accounts of group contact theory to warrant experimental test in Pettygrew and Tropp 
(2006) and Pettygrew et. al. (2011); these conditions were not respected in Adida et 
al.’s experimental design.  
 
The three pillars of economic rationality with respect to poverty 
Second, consider the framework of Duflo from which considerations of 
efficiency are derived in development economics with respect to the experiment we 
have scrutinized. According to Duflo, the farmers did not act efficiently because they 
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were unable to save the sufficient amount of money to buy fertilizers
21
. Buying the 
fertilizers suppose to be able to buy it in advance (during the harvest season) or to 
have some saving to buy it when it needs to be applied on the crops. As the farmers 
explained to Duflo, when they have money the shops do not have fertilizers and when 
the shops have the fertilizers the farmers do not have the money. Aware of that and in 
order to pursue an efficient behavior, the farmers should have saved  the money when 
the shops have fertilizers. But why the farmers were unable to save? For Duflo, the 
farmers were unable to save because they do not have a proper vision about how they 
will act in the future. They hope to be more patient in the future when they are 
impatient in the present. In that sense, they exhibit time inconsistencies. Duflo defines 
the time inconsistency following Robert Strotz’s (1955) work on impatience
22
. 
Consequently, these individuals do not make decisions that maximize lifetime 
satisfaction. By advocating that poor people are time inconsistent, Duflo points out 
                                                 
21
 “A simple explanation for these facts is that saving money for fertilizer is difficult, and 
farmers may overestimate their ability to save. Economists have labeled this type of behavior as “time 
inconsistency.” In essence, time inconsistency means that the way people plan to act in the future is 
different from the way they actually do act when the future arrives. The popularity of SAFI suggests 
that many farmers are aware of that difficulty and therefore have demand for commitment device to 
help them make good investments.” (J-PAL, Policy Briefcase 2011, 4) 
22
 “An individual is imagined to choose a plan of consumption for a future period of time so as 
to maximize the utility of the plan as the present moment. His choice is, of course, subject to a budget 
constraint. Our problem arises when we ask: If he is free to reconsider his plan at later dates, will he 
abide by it or disobey it – even through his original expectations of future desires and means of 
consumption are verified? Our answer is that the optimal plan of the present moment is generally one 
which will not be obeyed, or that the individual’s future behavior will be inconsistent with his optimal 
plan.” (Strotz, 1956, 165)  
“In the present, we are impulsive, governed in large part by emotions and immediate desire: 
small losses of time (standing in line to get child immunized) or petty discomforts (glutes that need to 
be woken up) that have to be endured right now feel much more unpleasant in the moment that when 
we think about them without a sense of immediacy (say, after a Christmas meal that was heavy enough 
to rule out all thoughts of immediate exercise). The reverse, of course, goes for small “rewards” 
(candy, a cigarette) that we really crave in the present; when we plan for the future, the pleasure from 
these treats seems less important.” (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011, 64-65) 
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that the poor are not fully rational because one dimension is missing in order to be 
efficient. It is only with an understanding about the lack of rationality from which 
poor suffer that we can understand completely the recommendation of Duflo et al.  
The notion of efficiency, in Duflo’s approach, is totally linked to the implicit one of 
rationality. And here rationality refers only to one dimension: time consistency.  
When Duflo challenged the theory of Schultz by saying that the poor are not efficient 
but inefficient, she asked “Poor but Rational?” (cf. title of Duflo 2006b) and 
maintained that the poor are rational but inefficient. Considering the life they face, the 
poor do the best they can. But at the end, when we try to understand what is behind 
this inefficiency of the poor, it seems that the only thing we see is irrationality as time 
inconsistency. To be sure, time inconsistency does not always implies irrationality as 
it is hotly debated in the literature on the topic (e.g. Vallois 2011, 2012 for detailed 
discussions). Roughly speaking, either time inconsistency is due to individuals’ lack 
of self control, hence it is usually considered irrational, or it is due to pathological 
environments, hence it is usually considered rational (the individual has no 
responsibility what-so-ever for the environment he lives in). Duflo’s policy 
recommendation through nudging clearly points toward the first interpretation, while 
her emphasis on the rationality of the poor points toward the second one. However, 
for the second interpretation to hold a detailed account of the structure of the 
environment is needed to understand where the problem lies; and there is no such 
account in Duflo’s interpretation. It is interesting here to draw a parallel with the early 
work done by Pierre Bourdieu (1977) in Algeria throughout the 1960s. Bourdieu’s 
account of the economic problems, especially regarding agriculture, faced by (or 
rather imposed on) a specific region of Algeria (Kabylie) makes it clear that ‘time’ is 
a crucial element structuring economic behaviors. But he strongly emphasizes that it 
is impossible to understand the way ‘time’ actually structures economic behaviors 
without understanding the way ‘time’ and social relations with ‘other people’ are 
mutually constitutive of each other, on the one hand, and constitute economic 
behaviors, on the other hand. But more importantly, is it enough to understand the 
behavior of the poor in order to fight poverty? Or do we need a larger definition of 
rationality? Today poverty is viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, therefore 
focusing on time inconsistency hides some essential aspects of poverty. Furthermore, 
Duflo et al. target the real choices and leave out the potential choices of individual. In 
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Senian terminology (see Sen 1999), Duflo et al. focused on the functionings of farmer 
but not on their capabilities –  potential choices (see also Davis 2013b). 
 
The three pillars of economic rationality with respect to insurance and 
default options more generally 
Third, consider the framework of Johnson et. al. (2000) from which 
considerations of efficiency are drawn in behavioral economics. We have seen 
previously that Johnson et. al. (2000) has been instrumental in the rise of libertarian 
paternalism although without having any real impact on actual auto-insurance 
regulations. Obviously there is more than just individuals’ behavior toward ‘the 
unknown’ that drives the efficiency or inefficiency of auto-insurance markets, 
especially when auto-insurance is compulsory by law (e.g., Anderson, Heaton and 
Carroll 2010 for a detailed discussion of auto-insurance market in the U.S). From 
experimental and theoretical perspectives, it is interesting to briefly draw a parallel 
between Johnson et al. (2000) and two other lines of decision theoretically oriented 
research. The first one concerns the relationships between intertemporal decision and 
decision under risk and uncertainty, and is already fairly discussed in economics so 
we shall be very brief on it, and just mention that since the seminal contribution of  
Menahem Yaari (1965), decision theorists have worked on how “the crucial cognitive 
distinction between the present and the future can be traced to the certainty of the 
former and the inherent uncertainty associated with the latter” (Halevy 2008, p.1146; 
see this reference for a detailed discussion of this line of research). The second line of 
research concerns the relationships between interpersonal decisions and decision 
under risk and uncertainty developed in the work of social psychology-oriented 
decision theorist Craig McKenzie. Since it is hardly discussed in economics, we will 
rapidly expose the substance of this line of research. The work of McKenzie and his 
co-authors has makes it clear that behind every framing effects related to choices 
under risk and uncertainty discussed in behavioral economics, there is an issue of, 
roughly speaking, interpersonal decision (McKenzie and Nelson 2003, McKenzie et 
al. 2006, Sher and McKenzie 2006, 2008, 2011). More precisely, drawing on 
psycholinguistic analysis of pragmatics (see Keren 2011 for detailed discussions), 
McKenzie and his co-authors conceive every decision problem as taking place 
between a listener, i.e., the decision maker who makes the decision, and a speaker, 
i.e., the decision modeler who frame the decision problem. Their research strategy 
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roughly proceeds as follows. They start by reproducing the results of behavioral 
economics in terms of listener’s inconsistent preferences for risk and uncertainty, i.e. 
the traditional preference reversals using the related traditional experimental designs. 
Then, they conduct further experiments using new experimental designs which they 
call “embedded creativity” (Sher and McKenzie 2006, p.487) to test (1) the factors 
that determine speakers’ choice of frame and (2) if these factors (that are implicit in 
the decision problems) explicitly influence the choices of the listeners, which is 
usually the case. They interpret their results as going against the usual interpretation 
of behavioral economics in terms of irrationality of the decision makers. For 
McKenzie and his co-authors, it is not the choices of the decision makers that explain 
the reversals of preferences, rather, it is the normative models of choices that do not 
properly account for the interactions between (in our terms) behaviors (of the 
listener/decision maker) toward ‘the unknown’ and behaviors toward ‘other people’ 
(i.e. speakers/decision modeler). They discussed this interpretation around the 
problems of default options to show how listeners (citizen/consumers in the real 
world) adapt their behaviors toward ‘the unknown’ by paying attention to ‘other 
people’, i.e., to the way speakers (the government/firms in the real world) frame 
decision problems (McKenzie et. al. 2006). 
 
We have tried to make the case that the analytical distinction between the 
three pillars of economic rationality, however fruitful for our comprehension, at an 
abstract level, of the respective dimensions of behaviors they respectively refer, 
clearly is not sufficient to understand economic behaviors at the applied level we have 
discussed here. This is somewhat surprising since an understanding of each of the 
social phenomena we have discussed in this paper exists in literatures that are more or 
less outside of economics, and that the applied microeconomics contribution we have 
scrutinized here all advocates for theoretical and methodological interdisciplinarity. 
This might be even more surprising when such understanding is partly provided by 
economics-oriented decision theorist. 
To be clear, we do not call for systematically taking into account of the three 
pillars of economic rationality in applied microeconomics (the technical issues that 
this raises are well known), but rather for a reflection on how the three pillars are (at 
least partly) mutually constitutive of each others. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has investigated how foundational and conceptual issues around 
economic rationality that are usually discussed with respect to economic theory, 
materialize into recent applied microeconomics. We have concentrated on three 
radically different subfield of microeconomics – the economics of discrimination, 
development economics and the economics of insurance – and have observed how the 
recent rise of experimental methods and behavioral economics within mainstream 
economics has impacted these subfields. The main impact, we have argued, is the 
changes in the conceptual relationship between economic rationality and economic 
efficiency, without changes in the substance of these notions. We have insisted on 
how the specificity of our reflexive perspective to go from applied work of 
microeconomics in the field to conceptual and foundational issues on rationality 
reveals another issue that has not been much discussed in the reflexive literature yet, 
around the analytical distinction made in economics among interpersonal preferences, 
intertemporal preferences and preferences for risk and uncertainty. We have argued 
that, although very sound at a theoretical level, this analytical distinction is not 
(never?) warranted at an applied level; and this has straightforward consequences both 
on both economic theory and on the real world through the policy recommendations 
made by microeconomists. 
Twenty years ago, Daniel Hausman remarked about the work done in decision 
theory on choices under risk and uncertainty that:  
“For the most part only faint echoes of the controversies concerning expected 
utility theory are heard within economics, since most economic models still 
assume that agents have perfect knowledge and employ only ordinal utility 
theory. […]. The challenges to expected utility theory raise interesting 
methodological issues about the role of evidence in economics. (1992, p.27, our 
emphasize). 
 
Twenty years later, we can say that this remark still applies at the theoretical 
level Hausman is discussing, extends to the explosion of decision theoretic work on 
interpersonal decisions and intertemporal decisions that has happened ever since, 
carries over to the applied level we have discussed here, and further impact the real 
world through the implicit/indirect or explicit/direct policy recommendations made by 
microeconomists. 
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